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Abstract
Schupbach and Sprenger (2011) introduce a novel probabilistic approach
to measuring the explanatory power that a given explanans exerts over a
corresponding explanandum. Though we are sympathetic to their general
approach, we argue that it does not (without revision) adequately capture
the way in which the causal explanatory power that c exerts on e varies
with background knowledge. We then amend their approach so that it does
capture this variance. Though our account of explanatory power is less
ambitious than Schupbach and Sprenger’s in the sense that it is limited to
causal explanatory power, it is also more ambitious because we do not limit
its domain to cases where c genuinely explains e. Instead, we claim that c
causally explains e if and only if our account says that c explains e with
some positive amount of causal explanatory power.
1 Introduction
There are many contexts in which we care how much the occurrence of an
event causally explains the occurrence of another. Consider the recent presi-
dential election in the United States. As we try to understand why President
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Trump won, we ask ourselves how much the election results are explained
by Comey’s timely announcement of the investigation against Hillary Clin-
ton, and whether Comey’s announcement better explains the election results
than does Trump’s promise to build a wall between the United States and
Mexico.
Answering questions like these requires knowledge of the causal system at
play. If we want to know how much c causally explains e then we must know
whether and how c causes e.2 But knowledge of the causal relationship(s)
between c and e does not suffice for knowledge of the extent to which c
causally explains e. This is because the causal influence that c exerts over
e does not depend on what we know, while the extent to which c causally
explains e does depend on what we know. Roughly put, the job of an
explanation is to confer understanding, and since understanding can only
be conferred to some agent(s), the extent to which c causally explains e
should be specified relative to the understanding agent’s (or agents’) body of
knowledge. The same is not true of the extent to which c causally promotes
e since causal promotion is a worldly dependence relation that exists no
matter whether there are any agents around to witness it.
Our task in this paper is to develop a method for assessing the extent
to which c causally explains e given knowledge of the causal system at play.
We follow in the footsteps of Schupbach and Sprenger (2011) in thinking
that the explanatory power c has over e is (in some way) determined by the
extent to which the occurrence of c makes the occurrence of e less surprising.
However, we argue that Schupbach and Sprenger’s own method for deter-
mining explanatory power is not sufficient for accurately capturing the way
in which the explanatory power that c exerts over e depends on background
knowledge in paradigmatic cases of causal explanation. Our task, then, is to
develop a novel method of assessing explanatory power in terms of surprise
reduction that fares better than Schupbach and Sprenger’s approach when
applied to causal explanations.
This means that our ambitions are a bit different from Schupbach and
Sprenger’s. They restrict the domain of their account to cases where c
genuinely explains e, but do not restrict the domain of their account to
2Throughout the paper we adopt the convention of referring to variables with upper case
letters and values of variables with lower case letters. Here, we make it clear that we are
interested in the explanatory power that a value of a variable exerts over another.
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cases where c causally explains e. Our account is less ambitious in the sense
that it is limited to causal explanatory power, but more ambitious in the
sense that we do not limit its domain to cases where c genuinely explains e.3
Instead, we claim that c causally explains e if and only if our account says
that c explains e with some positive amount of causal explanatory power.4
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we introduce Schup-
bach and Sprenger’s measure of explanatory power. In section 3, we raise
some issues surrounding the interpretation of the probability function used
in the definition of their measure, before proposing an interpretation that
bypasses these problems. Section 4 considers the problem of accounting
for the influence of background knowledge on the evaluation of explanatory
power. We show that standard Bayesian methods for accounting for such
knowledge yield counterintuitive verdicts when applied to particular kinds of
causal systems. Section 5 outlines our novel approach to quantifying causal
explanatory power and shows how it naturally resolves the issues discussed
in previous sections. Section 6 concludes and outlines new directions for
future research.
Before going further, it is worth noting that this paper is situated within
a broadly interventionist understanding of causation, of the type developed
by e.g. Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (2011), Pearl (2009), and Woodward
(2005).5 Although our approach makes extensive use of the causal modelling
framework, we do our best to make the presentation self contained. Readers
seeking a thorough introduction to the formalism should consult e.g. the
first two chapters of Pearl (2009).
2 The Logic of Explanatory Power
In developing their approach to explanatory power, Schupbach and
Sprenger (2011) start from the basic premise that
3Relatedly, our account applies only relative to a causal hypothesis, whereas their account
can be applied sans any causal hypothesis.
4We discuss these issues in greater detail in Section 5.
5Of course, the term ‘interventionist’ is a vague one and there are important differences
between the approaches forwarded by these authors. The sense in which our treatment of ex-
planatory power is distinctively interventionist will become clear in later sections.
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[A] hypothesis offers a powerful explanation of a proposition...to
the extent that it makes that proposition less surprising...for ex-
ample, a geologist will accept a prehistoric earthquake as ex-
planatory of certain observed deformations in layers of bedrock
to the extent that deformations of that particular character, in
that particular layer of bedrock, et cetera would be less surpris-
ing given the occurrence of such an earthquake.’ (Schupbach and
Sprenger 2011: 108).
This is a natural starting point that fits well with many everyday in-
tuitions about explanation. When we try to explain the occurrence of an
event,6 e, we try to better understand why e’s occurrence was rendered likely
or necessitated by antecedent events. Consider President Trump’s victory
once more. As we try to explain what happened, we search for those events
whose occurrence makes the election results unsurprising. It thus seems
reasonable to say that there is at least a sense in which an event c explains
e to the extent that c makes e less surprising or more expected.7
There may be multiple ways to formalise what it is for one event to
make another less surprising. Schupbach and Sprenger work in the context
of Bayesian probability theory. Specifically, one event c will render another
event e less surprising if and only if P (e) < P (e|c).8 The strength of this in-
equality is called the ‘statistical relevance’ between e and c. In light of these
considerations, Schupbach and Sprenger posit the following criterion as
a basic requirement of any measure ε(e, c) of the extent to which c explains e:
Positive Relevance (PR): Ceteris paribus, the greater the degree of
6Schupbach and Sprenger speak in terms of a hypothesis explaining some evidence, rather
than in terms of an event explaining another event. We translate their discussion into event-
speak because we find it more natural when discussing distinctively causal explanations. But
it is worth mentioning that we are neutral with respect to whether a causal explanation of an
event must include information about covering laws or explanatory generalisations (in addition
to information about some antecedent event(s)). By our lights, and as will become clear later, the
explanatory power that one event exerts over is accounted for by some covering laws and/or ex-
planatory generalisations no matter whether such information must be included in the explanans.
Woodward and Hitchcock (2003) present an account according to which such information must
be included; Lewis (1986) argues that it needn’t be.
7Section 5.4.2 considers competing senses in which an event can be rendered ‘less surprising’.
8This assumes the standard definition of conditional probability as P (e|c) = P (e∧c)P (c) .
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statistical relevance between e and c, the higher ε(e, c).
Philosophically, PR is the core idea behind Schupbach and Sprenger’s ap-
proach to measuring explanatory power. It requires that, other things being
equal, the extent to which c explains e should be a function primarily of the
degree to which c raises the subjective probability of e. Broadly speaking,
we are sympathetic to this intuition, and will use it as a guiding principle
for the development of our measure of causal explanatory power. Crucially
though, PR implies ceteris paribus that statistical relevance is both a nec-
essary and a sufficient condition for an event c to have explanatory power
over another event e.9 Though this poses no problems for Schupbach and
Sprenger (because they limit the domain to genuinely successful explana-
tions), we will see that we must drop PR in order to distinguish genuinely
successful causal explanations from unsuccessful causal explanations.
Schupbach and Sprenger posit six other criteria that ε(e, c) is required to
satisfy. Apart from PR, the only other criterion we need to consider requires
that ε(e, c) should be (partially) independent of the prior probability of c,
Irrelevance of Priors (IP): Values of ε(e, c) do not (always) depend
upon the values of P (c).10
IP encodes the idea that the extent to which a given event c explains
another event e is not dependent upon considerations of how likely c is in
itself. For example, a tornado might be an excellent explanation of a broken
weather vane, regardless of the fact that the prior probability of a tornado
occurring is very low. We are measuring the extent to which c would render
e less surprising, in the event that c occurs. Clearly, this quantity should be
independent of our prior degree of belief in c occurring.
The seven criteria postulated by Schupbach and Sprenger are jointly
sufficient to uniquely determine the following measure of explanatory power,
Definition 2.1 SSE: ε(e, c) = P (c|e)−P (c|¬e)P (c|e)+P (c|¬e)
9The ‘ceteris paribus’ clause can be removed when we assume that c is genuinely explanatory
of e.
10The condition that Schupbach and Sprenger actually use is slightly technical, but its central
philosophical content is captured by IP as stated here.
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For our purposes, the explicit form of ε(e, c) will not be terribly impor-
tant.11 Our focus is on the fundamental assumption of PR and its impli-
cations. With Schupbach and Sprenger, we are happy to accept IP as a
philosophical constraint on the notion of explanatory power.
3 Subjective and Nomic Distributions
3.1 Actual Degrees of Belief
Implicit in the Bayesian approach to explanatory power described above
is the assumption that the probability functions deployed represent belief
states. But whose belief states, and what kind of belief state? If the prob-
ability function is interpreted as reflecting the subjective belief state of the
agent evaluating the explanation, then the Bayesian approach faces what
we might call the ‘explanatory old evidence problem’. For example, when
we ask why Newcastle beat Sunderland, we usually know that Newcastle
actually beat Sunderland, and therefore give the explanandum a subjective
prior probability of 1.12 But this is problematic. For e cannot be rendered
less surprising by anything when it already has probability 1. And that’s not
all. The explanatory old evidence problem has an equally problematic flip
side. As well as being certain that the explanandum occurred, we might also
be certain about the occurrence of the prospective explanans. For example,
when we are interested in how well the stock market crash of 1929 explains
the Great Depression, we know that both of these events occurred, but c
cannot raise the probability of e if c is already assigned probability 1. So
in order to rescue the Bayesian approach, one must think of the probability
function as expressing something other than our actual degrees of belief.
3.2 The Causal Distribution
Though the occurrence of the tornado may not make us more confident
that the weather vane has broken (since we could have already seen both
11For detailed discussions of the virtues of this and other measures of explanatory power, see
e.g. Cohen (2015), Crupi and Tentori (2012).
12Note that we are not committed here to the claim that explanation always presupposes
certainty about the explanandum, only that it often does so.
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the tornado and the broken weather vane), there is obviously a sense in
which the tornado’s occurrence makes it less surprising that the weather
vane broke. What does this reduction of surprise consist in?
At first pass, it seems that an event c reduces the surprise of another
event e to the extent that the occurrence of c provides reason to expect e
given our best understanding of the causal system at play. That is, even
when we know that there was a tornado and know that the weather vane is
broken, the tornado’s occurrence still makes the weather vane’s breaking less
surprising in the sense that our best understanding of the causal relationship
between tornadoes and weather vanes tells us that we have strong reason to
expect the weather vane to break in the event of a tornado.
This suggests that if we want to follow Schupbach and Sprenger in con-
struing reduction of surprise as some kind of increase in probability, we
should use probability distributions that encode what it is reasonable to
expect about the events in question, given what we know about the causal
system at play. Since these distributions must be consistent with the causal
relationships (or structural equations) that govern the causal system, we
refer to them as ‘causal distributions’.13
For example, suppose that our best theory of the causal system governing
the condition of the weather vane says that the probability of there being a
tornado is .05 and that the probability of the weather vane breaking given
that there is a tornado is .75, while the probability of the weather vane
breaking given that there is not a tornado is only .005.1415
13To be clear, we don’t take ourselves to be defending a novel interpretation of probability.
Rather, we simply mean to propose that the probabilities deployed are those that express the
causal relationships in a causal hypothesis (no matter how they are interpreted). Thus there is
still room to think of our approach as situated within a broadly Bayesian approach to explanatory
power.
14For those who are familiar with structural equation models, the causal distribution for a
causal system over a variable set V can be systematically recovered through specification, first,
of the structural equations that describe the way in which the probability distribution over
each variable depends on the probability distribution of its immediate causal predecessors or
‘parents’ and its error term, and, second, the unconditional probability distribution over all of the
exogenous (parentless) variables. Since the probabilities over the exogenous variables represent
reasonable prior expectations for these variables, and the structural equations represent the ‘laws’
that govern the causal system, the probability distribution that is implied by the structural
equation model seems to give us exactly what we need.
15The reader may harbour doubts about our capacity to determine the unconditional proba-
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The causal distribution includes these probability estimates, as well as
every other probability estimate that is implied by the causal hypothesis at
hand. Moreover, the causal distribution satisfies any constraints implied by
whatever causal graph is under consideration. So if we consider a causal
hypothesis according to which the only causal dependencies between X,
Y , and Z can be represented as X → Y ← Z, then X and Z must be
probabilistically independent in the causal distribution.16
Since the causal distribution corresponds to what the causal details of the
system give us reason to expect, rather than to our knowledge about what
actually happens or has happened, the causal distribution is not obviously
riddled with problems of old evidence. That is, even when we know that
there actually was a tornado and that the weather vane actually broke, the
causal distribution does not say that these events obtain with probability 1
because its probability estimates instead correspond to what the “laws” of
the causal system tell us we have (or had) reason to expect.17
In some contexts, there may be reason to regard the laws of the causal
system as true laws of nature–e.g., if we want to discuss whether c causally
explains e relative to the (perhaps unknown) facts about the causal sys-
tem. But we also might usefully deploy causal distributions that convey
our presuppositions about the causal system at hand, rather than the truth
about the causal system. For example, if we’ve just read a textbook about
the causal relationship between c and e, then even if the textbook is wrong
(unbeknownst to us), it is reasonable for us to assess whether and to what
extent c causally explains e relative to the causal distribution that encodes
what the textbook says about the causal system. In order to capture both of
these senses, we do not require that the causal distribution is true. But we
do suspect that there are contexts where it is reasonable to care exclusively
bility estimates of exogenous variables since these are not supplied by the structural equations.
We are sympathetic to these concerns and are correspondingly ecumenical about how these
probabilities should be set. In the absence of knowledge of long-run frequencies, one might jus-
tifiably use tools in the objective Bayesian toolbox to determine these estimates–e.g., principles
of indifference.
16This follows from the Causal Markov Condition (see section 4).
17The causal distribution assigns probability 1 to an event only if the causal hypothesis at play
says that the event will certainly occur. Although we associate these probabilities with the ‘laws’,
we do not take this to constitute a necessary deviation from standard Bayesian interpretations
of probability.
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about whether c explains e relative to the truth, as well as contexts where it
is reasonable to care exclusively about whether c explains e relative to our
presuppositions (regardless of their truth).
No matter whether the causal distribution must be true, it is clear that
the notion of surprise that underwrites our treatment of causal explanatory
power is somewhat distinct from the notion that is interpreted in terms of
actual degrees of belief. Since the strength of c as an explanation for e
depends on the extent to which the occurrence of c renders e less surpris-
ing according to reasonable (causal) expectation, rather than the extent to
which c renders e less surprising to actual agent(s), the explanatory power
that c exerts over e is better understood as depending on the extent to
which c would have rendered e less surprising (given what we know about
the causal system) than as depending on the extent to which c actually does
render e less surprising.18
Alhough opting for causal distributions allows us to avoid issues that
arise when c and e are known, it gives rise to new problems because there
are certain pieces of background knowledge (not pertaining to c and e them-
selves) that seem to affect explanatory power. In the next section, we begin
to develop an account of explanatory power that can accommodate back-
ground knowledge as needed.
4 Background Knowledge
Consider the causal system in figure 1 (based on examples from Hesslow
(1976)). Birth control and pregnancy both cause thrombosis. However,
birth control causally inhibits pregnancy. It is possible for this system to be
‘unfaithful’,19 where BC and TH are statistically independent, regardless of
18It is tempting to say that the extent to which c explains e does depends on the extent to
which c would render e less surprising had c not happened, but the phrase ‘had c not happened’
is ambiguous between ‘had c not happened with certainty’ and ‘had c occurred with the non-
extreme probability suggested by the causal system’. If ‘had c not happened’ is understood in
the latter way, we are happy with this characterization of the counterfactual query. But our
survey of the literature suggests that most philosophers understand ‘had c not happened’ in the
former way (see e.g. Briggs 2012, Halpern 2000, Woodward 2005).
19When we say that a system is unfaithful, we mean that the assumed probability distribu-
tion/graph pair does not satisfy the Causal Faithfulness Condition (see Spirtes, Glymour and
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Figure 1: Birth Control, Pregnancy, Thrombosis
the fact that the causal model represents TH as being causally dependent on
BC. Intuitively, this will happen when the two paths from BC to TH ‘can-
cel out’ exactly. It might be that, although birth control causally promotes
thrombosis through some physical mechanism, this effect is completely and
perfectly negated in a statistical sense by the fact that birth control is neg-
atively correlated with pregnancy, which is itself a cause of thrombosis. In
such a case there will be no correlation between birth control and thrombo-
sis, despite the causal connection between the two phenomena. It is easy to
see that ε(th, bc) = 0 will then be guaranteed to hold. So our attempted ex-
planation of Suzy’s thrombosis by her taking birth control pills will have no
power whatsoever, which seems correct. If we know nothing about whether
or not Suzy has been pregnant, then her having taken birth control would
not render her thrombosis any less surprising (since taking birth control does
not raise the probability of getting thrombosis in the causal distribution).
But now suppose that we also happen to know that Suzy has never been
pregnant. In this case, it seems clear that Suzy’s taking of birth control
pills very strongly explains her thrombosis. For in this case our knowledge
of Suzy’s pregnancy breaks the correlation between pregnancy and birth
control, thereby inducing a strong correlation between birth control and
thrombosis. Given that we know that she is not pregnant, Suzy’s taking of
birth control pills renders her thrombosis much less surprising.
Thus, we should think that bc exerts considerable explanatory power
over th. However, the causal interpretation of the probability distribution
prevents us from straightforwardly obtaining this result. This follows from
Scheines (2000)). The Causal Faithfulness Condition is satisfied by a given graph/probability
distribution pair exactly when all and only the independencies entailed by the Causal Markov
Condition (discussed in detail later in this section) obtain.
10
N C
S
Figure 2: Smoking, Cancer, Nicorette
the fact that the causal probability of pregnancy does not correspond to our
subjective degree of belief about the particular instantiation of that causal
system. We need some way to update the causal distribution to allow it to
take into account our background knowledge which, as we have seen, can
have a significant effect on our judgements of explanatory strength.
Perhaps it seems like this case can be bracketed since it involves the
cancellation of causal paths, and such cancellation rarely occurs. But this is
not right. Consider the causal system in figure 2, according to which chewing
Nicorette reduces the probability that one subsequently smokes (and thereby
significantly reduces the probability of the later onset of cancer), but also
increases the probability of cancer along a distinct path (because of the
deleterious effect that chewing Nicorette has on the body).
Here, we can easily imagine that Nicorette’s total effect is healthy in
the sense that it reduces the probability of cancer because the causal path
that is mediated by smoking is stronger than the other.20 Thus if we know
nothing about whether John stops smoking after chewing Nicorette, his
taking Nicorette appears to increase the surprise (by reducing the causal
probability) of his cancer. But if we know that John quits smoking (upon
chewing the Nicorette), but does subsequently get cancer, it seems that
Nicorette does causally explain his cancer to some extent. Thus, just as the
introduction of background knowledge can render c explanatorily relevant
to e when it otherwise wouldn’t be (as in Suzy’s case), it also can change
the extent to which c is explanatorily relevant to e in cases where c is
explanatorily relevant to e sans background knowledge (as in John’s case).
20See Woodward (2003) for helpful discussion of total effects, contributing effects, and direct
effects.
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Before proposing a solution to this problem, it is useful to make two
small clarifications about our general approach. Firstly, the account pre-
sented here applies most naturally to token-level causal explanations, as
opposed to type-level explanations. In the previous case, for example, it
seems that we are interested not in the question of how much the taking of
birth control explains thrombosis in general, but rather in how much par-
ticular instances of thrombosis are explained by particular instances of the
taking of birth control pills. When considering questions of this kind, it is
clear that our judgements typically depend on our background knowledge
of the facts surrounding the relevant instantiation of the causal system.
Secondly, philosophers sometimes speak in terms of ‘how-possibly’ and
‘how-actually’ explanations. We are interested in both. That is, we want
a treatment that works well both when we are trying to explain why e did
occur and also why e might occur.
At this juncture, it is also useful to introduce Pearl’s (2009) language
of ‘d-separation’ in order to facilitate discussion of the the way in which
causal explanatory power varies with background knowledge. The language
of d-separation is useful for characterising the probabilistic conditional
independencies that are entailed by the Causal Markov Condition (an
axiom of the graphical approach to causal modeling), given a directed
acylic graph (DAG) whose edges depict the causal relations at play.21
The Causal Markov Condition is the assumption that encodes the fact
that causes “screen off” their effects and is likewise presumed by the
interventionist approach to causation (see e.g. Hausman and Wood-
ward (1999)). If every (undirected) path between a pair of variables is
d-separated by Z (according to a given causal graph), then the pair of
variables must be probabilistically independent of each other conditional
on any assignment of values over Z, where d-separation is defined as follows,
d-separation: A path between two variables, X and Y , is d-separated
(or blocked) by a (possibly empty) set of variables, Z, if and only if
i the path between X and Y contains a non-collider that is in Z, or
ii the path contains a collider, and neither the collider nor any descendant
21A DAG graphically represents the causal relations that obtain among a set of variables V as
a set of directed edges (or arrows), such that no directed path forms a cycle.
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Figure 3: Birth Control, Pregnancy, Thrombosis, Death
of the collider is in Z.
Collider: A variable is a collider along a path if and only if it is the direct
effect of two variables along the path. (So M is a collider along I →M ← J
but not along I ←M → J or I →M → J .)
4.1 Conditionalisation and Colliders
Returning to the problem at hand, there is an obvious fix available here.
In particular, we can simply condition on our background knowledge to
update the causal distribution. So, in Suzy’s case, we continue to use the
causal distribution but simply condition on the knowledge that Suzy is not
pregnant. Since P d-separates BC and TH along the top path and bc is
strong evidence for th conditional on either value of P , ε(th, bc) is forced
to have a high value. However, this solution quickly breaks down when we
consider slightly more complex causal systems.
Suppose we also represent whether Suzy dies with another variable D
(see figure 3). Plausibly, death is causally influenced by both the taking
of birth control pills and thrombosis.22 If we have no knowledge about
whether Suzy is pregnant, then thrombosis is independent of birth control,
and this rules out birth control as a viable explanation. But now suppose
that we happen to know that Suzy tragically went on to die. Following the
22For instance, imagine that birth control pills have as a positive side-effect that they causally
inhibit the occurence of particular types of cancer, and so are negatively correlated with death.
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Figure 4: Dominoes 1-4
procedure of conditioning on background knowledge, we should condition
on our knowledge that Suzy died. Unfortunately, this leads to some dubious
results. Crucially, death is causally downstream of both birth control and
thrombosis. So updating our knowledge of D involves conditioning on a
collider between BC and TH. This means that we may introduce a spurious
correlation between birth control and thrombosis. If birth control has a
negative direct causal effect on death (which is conceivable) then the nature
of this new correlation will be positive. This will mean that ε(th, bc) will
be positive after we condition on D = d, whereas it was zero before we
did so, i.e. conditioning on death gave the explanation of thrombosis by
birth control power where it previously had none. But this seems wrong.
D is causally downstream of both the explanans and the explanandum, and
our knowledge of its value should have no bearing on our assessment of the
prospective causal explanation. Indeed, if one thinks only about temporal
order then this point become even more apparent. How can death affect
the extent to which birth control causally explains thrombosis when it only
occurred after the birth control pills had been taken and the subject had
developed thrombosis? Clearly, something is wrong here.
Another amendment suggests itself. In particular, it is tempting to im-
pose the condition that we only update on knowledge that is not causally
downstream of the explanandum. This deals nicely with the case discussed
above without requiring any major ammendments to the overall strategy.
Sadly though, it doesn’t work. To see this, consider the causal system in
figure 4.
Here, we are considering a system of four dominoes (D1, ..., D4).
D1, D2, D3 are lined up in a row and D4 is placed off to the side, equidistant
from D2 and D3. The nodes in the network each have two possible values,
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i.e. the dominoe either does or doesn’t fall. D1 has some prior probability
of falling, and if it falls, it will knock down D2 with some probability, and
D2 will then have some probability of knocking down D3. Similarly, D4 has
some prior probability of falling, and once it falls there is some probability
that it knocks down D2/D3.
We are interested in knowing how well D1 falling explains D3 falling.
Suppose that we know that D2 fell. In this case, when explanatory power is
understood in terms of reduction of surprise, it seems like D1 falling should
exert zero explanatory power over D3 falling, since D1 can only influence
D3 via D2.
23,24 So if we know that D2 fell, then any knowledge about D1
should be explanatorily irrelevant to D3. Once we know that D2 fell, D1
falling doesn’t tell us anything new about why D3 fell.
Now, since D2 is not causally downstream of the explanandum (D3) we
are allowed to condition on this knowledge. But since D1 and D4 are d-
connected by D2, it is consistent with the Causal Markov Condition that
there is a correlation between the falling of the first and fourth dominoes
when we condition, even though there is no explanatory power. Thus, by
conditioning on our background knowledge, we get the wrong result again.
And this time we can’t blame the problem on the fact that the background
knowledge is downstream of the explanandum. There is something else going
wrong at a deeper level.
4.2 A Helpful Intervention
Even with the restriction that we only update on background knowledge
that is not downstream of the explanandum, conditioning on background
knowledge appears to affect our judgments of explanatory power in an un-
intuitive way. Luckily, there is an alternative approach available to us. In
particular, we can invoke the notion of a counterfactual ‘intervention’. The
proposal then is to intervene on the relevant items of background knowledge,
rather than conditioning.
23See section 5.4.1 for further discussion of possible objections that may arise for this sort of
case.
24Contrast this with the case where we know nothing about whether D2 fell. In that case,
D1’s falling does look like a very good explanation of D3’s falling, since it does seem to tell us a
lot about why D3 fell.
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One can compute the effect of intervening on a causal system to set a
variable to a particular value. Following Pearl (2009), Spirtes, Glymour
and Scheines (2000), and Woodward (2005), allow the intervention on X
to represent some justifiably omitted cause of X that can be exploited to
set X to a value x. Since omitted causes cannot be common causes, the
intervention on X must be d-separated and therefore independent from all
of X’s non-descendants.
Consider again the causal system depicted in figure 4. As before, suppose
that we happen to know that D2 fell. In this case, D1’s falling should exert
no explanatory power over D3 falling. This is because all of D1’s potential
explanatory power is via D2, and we already know that D2 fell (the causal
influence that D1 exerts over D3 all travels through D2). We saw that simply
conditioning on our knowledge that D2 fell violates these intuitions. But
according to our new proposal, we should rather intervene on the causal
system to ensure that D2 falls. Since the intervention to make D2 fall is
d-separated from D1 (and therefore not correlated with D1), intervening
effectively ‘breaks’ the edge between D1 and D2. (This may be intuitive
since there is a sense in which exogenous interventions are disruptions to the
causal system.) This allows us to set the probability of d2 to 1 (accurately
reflecting our background knowledge), but because we have broken the edge
between D1 and D2, no new correlations between D1 and D3 via D4 are
introduced. Thus we get the good without the bad. D1 and D3 are now
statistically independent, meaning that ε(d3, d1) = 0 will have to hold, as
desired. Our proposal naturally provides the right answer in this case.
Furthermore, our new proposal makes the artificial condition that we
should only take into account background knowledge that is not down-
stream of the explanandum unneccessary. Consider again the system in
figure 3 and suppose that we know that Suzy went on to die, but we have
no other background knowledge about her particular case. According to the
previous proposal, we should condition on Suzy’s death, but as we saw this
affects our evaluation of the explanatory relationship between bc and th in a
problematic way. Following the new procedure, we propose that we should
rather intervene to ensure Suzy’s death.25 Because the intervention on D
is d-separated from the causal predecessors of D (unlike D itself), the cor-
relation between between BC and TH remains unaffected, so ε(th, bc) = 0
25No Suzies were harmed in the writing of this paper.
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continues to hold, as desired.26 Thus, the new procedure is equally able
to deal with background knowledge of events that are causally downstream
of the explanandum. This means that we no longer need to impose by
hand the artificial restriction that some of our background knowledge about
the particular case should be ignored when we’re evaluating explanatory
strength.
In light of these examples, we conclude that when updating the causal
distribution to take into account the background knowledge of the agent
assessing the strength of an explanation, we should always intervene (and
not condition) on the relevant background knowledge. More generally, the
examples discussed so far clearly illustrate the importance of taking into
account background knowledge when assessing the strength of a prospective
causal explanation.
5 Causal Explanatory Power
Let’s summarise our progress so far. We saw that the Bayesian faces two
old-evidence style problems when probabilities are interpreted as actual de-
grees of belief. Happily, these problems were resolved by opting for the
causal distribution. However, this led to a new problem regarding how to
take into account the background knowledge of the agent evaluating the ex-
planation. We saw that taking an interventionist approach to background
knowledge gave intuitively correct answers in cases where standard Bayesian
conditionalisation failed. So now that we have a satisfactory interpretation
of the relevant probability distributions and are able to account for the con-
text sensitivity of causal explanatory power, all that remains is to find a
suitable measure. At this stage, it is tempting to simply adopt the following
procedure.
(1) First, represent the causal system in which the explanans and ex-
planandum are embedded and work out the causal distribution for
that system, according to our current best knowledge.
26Woodward (2005) famously exploits this feature of interventions when definining ‘direct
cause’ and ‘contributing cause’. By intervening on colliders, we do not induce spurious associa-
tions that would arise were we to simply condition.
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(2) Second, update on all your background knowledge (excluding only the
explanans and the explanandum themselves) regarding the causal sys-
tem by intervening to set the relevant variables to their known values.
(3) Calculate the explanatory power that the explanans exerts over the
explanandum using the measure ε, relative to the updated causal dis-
tribution.
On this approach, we would continue to use Schupbach and Sprenger’s
measure ε, but it would now be measuring statistical relevance relative to a
causal distribution that has been updated via interventions on the relevant
items of background knowledge.
5.1 The Applicability of Explanatory Power
Before going further, it makes sense to take into account a significant caveat
that Schupbach and Sprenger place on the applicability of ε. Specifically,
they write
[W]e restrict ourselves ... to speaking of theories that do in fact
provide explanations of the explanandum in question. This ac-
count thus is not intended to reveal the conditions under which
a theory is explanatory of some proposition (that is, after all,
the aim of an account of explanation rather than an account of
explanatory power); rather, its goal is to reveal, for any theory
already known to provide such an explanation, just how strong
that explanation is. (Schupbach and Sprenger 2011: 107)
To translate this passage into causal language, the measure ε is only
supposed to be applied to genuine causal explanations. We cannot apply
the measure in cases where the explanans has no causal explanatory bearing
whatsoever on the explanandum. Rather, we should rely on some external
theory of causal explanation to delineate for us the class of genuine causal
explanations, to which we can subsequently apply the measure. The mea-
sure itself cannot decide for us whether or not one event causally explains
another, but given that such an explanatory relationship exists, it can tell
us the strength of that relationship.
And this is fine, as far as it goes. However, it would be nice if our
measure of causal explanatory power was itself capable of determining, for
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any explanandum event e and any other event c, whether or not c is causally
explanatory of e. To see why this would be desirable, consider an analogy. It
might be that we are only interested in using scales to measure the weight of
things with mass, but it would also be nice if the scales read zero whenever
there is no mass to weigh.
5.2 Statistical Relevance 6= Causal Explanatory
Power
To see why ε can only be applied to genuine causal explanations, consider
the example depicted in figure 5. A is a binary variable corresponding to the
presence (or absence) of a sudden drop in atmospheric pressure. S and B
represent the coming of a storm and a drop in the Barometer, respectively.
Now, suppose that we want to explain a storm by a drop in the Barometer.
Clearly, this is a terrible causal explanation that should have zero strength.
However, B and S are both highly correlated with A. Since B and S are
d-connected and we have no background knowledge about A, B could have
a high degree of statistical relevance to S. It is not hard to see that ε(s, b)
will generally be high in such a setup, which conflicts with our very strong
intuitions that the drop in the barometer should have no causal explanatory
strength with respect to the storm. The upshot of this example is that
statistical relevance is not sufficient for causal explanatory strength, and so
ε, as a measure of statistical relevance, is bound to give the wrong answer
in such cases.
As noted above, Schupbach and Sprenger actually anticipate this sort of
problem. Since b does not provide a genuine causal explanation of s, the
measure simply shouldn’t be applied in this kind of case. However, it is
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independently desirable to have a measure that is itself able to detect when
an event c fails to provide a causal explanation of an explanandum e. We
now turn our attention to providing such a measure.
5.3 Interventionist Explanatory Power
Finally, we propose the following procedure for computing explanatory
power,
(1) First, represent the causal system in which the explanans and ex-
planandum are embedded and work out the causal distribution for
that system, according to our current best knowledge.
(2) Second, update on all your background knowledge (excluding only the
explanans and the explanandum themselves) regarding the causal sys-
tem by intervening to set the relevant variables to their known values.
(3) Calculate the explanatory power that intervening to make the ex-
planans true exerts over the explanandum using the measure ε, relative
to the updated causal distribution.
Thus, according to the new procedure, the explanatory power that an
explanans c exerts over an explanandum e will be defined as E(e, c) =
ε(e, do(c)), where ε is Schupbach and Sprenger’s measure of statistical rele-
vance and do(c) represents our intervention to make c occur.27
27One might be concerned that the new procedure for calculating explanatory power suffers
from a basic flaw. Suppose, for example, we want to explain the storm by the drop in the
barometer and we happen to know that there was a drop in atmospheric pressure. Following our
procedure, we (i) adopt the causal distribution for the system, (ii) update on our background
knowledge by intervening to make A = a true, (iii) measure the relevance of do(B = b) to S = s,
i.e. intervene to make B = b true and see how the probability of S = s changes in the updated
causal distribution. But now, suppose that we are also interested in evaluating the explanatory
power of a drop in atmospheric pressure for the presence of a storm, and we happen to know that
the barometer dropped. Following the procedure, we would (i) adopt the causal distribution,
(ii) update on our background knowledge by intervening to make B = b true, (iii) measure the
relevance of do(A = a) to S = s, i.e. intervene to make A = a true and see how the probability
of S = s changes in the updated causal distribution. Intuitively, these two explanations should
receive very different scores. The first one seems like a very bad explanation while the second
one looks like a potentially good explanation. But, it may seem that E will have to assign them
equal explanatory power because in both cases we end up intervening on B = b and A = a
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To justify this new procedure, consider again the example from figure 5.
If we have no relevant background knowledge, then P is just the standard
causal distribution. As before, suppose that we attempt to explain the storm
by the dropping of the barometer. It is not hard to see that intervening
to make the barometer drop is independent of the presence of a storm.
Specifically, intervening to make b true will sever the causal link between A
and B, thereby rendering S statistically independent of B. So P (s|do(b))−
P (s) = 0, i.e. E(b, s) = 0. And this is exactly the result that we wanted.
The dropping of the barometer has no explanatory power with respect to
the storm. Simply applying the measure ε to the explanandum and the
explanans gives the wrong result here, but applying ε to the explanandum
and the intervention on the explanans gives the right answer.28
Thus, the new measure E has a much broader domain of application than
Schupbach and Sprenger’s measure. E doesn’t rely on any external theory
of explanation in order to determine the candidate explanations to which it
can apply. Rather, E can be applied to any prospective causal explanation
and will itself determine whether or not it really deserves the name, and if
so, to what extent.
Although this new approach departs significantly from the original sta-
tistical relevance criterion PR, it still respects the intuition that a strong
explanation is one that makes the explanandum less surprising, but in a
and measuring how the probability of S = s changes. The only difference is the order in which
we intervene on B and A, and since interventions commute (as long as they are on different
variables), it may seem that this will make no difference (see Redacted).
Luckily, this objection rests on a basic misunderstanding. To see this, let’s introduce some new
terminology. Let C be the causal distribution for the system, and let CU be the result of updating
the causal distribution according to our background knowledge. Clearly, CU will be a different
function in each case (Since we have updated on different pieces of background knowledge in
the two cases) and so the degree to which s is subsequently confirmed by intervening on the
candidate explanandum will differ between the cases. The confusion stems from the fact that
the overall degrees of confirmation C(s|do(b), do(a)) and C(s|do(a), do(b)) are the same, but this
does not imply that E(s, b) and E(s, a) will be equal. And indeed, it is not hard to see that our
approach will provide the correct result that E(s, a) will be much greater than E(s, b) in these
cases.
28It should be noted that since E is defined as applying only to do(c), E fails to apply to
disjunctive explanations, since it is not clear how to intervene to make a disjunction true. A
similar issue arises with conjunctions (but it has been suggested that this can be solved through
the use of multiple interventions).
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different sense. On our approach, c is a good causal explanation for e to
the extent that intervening to make c occur would render e less surprising
in the causal distribution. And this seems right. By intervening to make c
true, we discard all non-causal correlations between c and e and isolate the
genuinely causal relationships between c and e, which are all we should take
into account when assessing the causal explanatory power of c for e.
5.4 E Illustrated
Consider the example depicted in figure 6. We suppose that there is a gene
that (i) makes people more likely to smoke, (ii) makes people less likely to
develop lung cancer. As usual, suppose that smoking also causes lung can-
cer. Suppose finally that this is an unfaithful causal system, i.e. smoking
and lung cancer are statistically independent even though smoking causally
promotes lung cancer. This is possible since smoking is now positively cor-
related with another causal inhibitor of lung cancer (G = g). However,
smoking could still be a very good explanation for somebody developing
lung cancer. So we have significant explanatory power and no statistical
relevance. Statistical relevance is neither necessary nor sufficient for ex-
planatory power. Contrast this with Hesslow’s example in figure 1. In that
case, the explanans (bc) is also statistically independent of the explanandum
(th). However, in that case, taking birth control does not make thrombosis
any less probable (because the canceling paths are causal), so it seems in-
tuitive that there should be zero explanatory power. Equating explanatory
power with statistical relevance gives the result that smoking has no ex-
planatory power for lung cancer and birth control has no explanatory power
for thrombosis. We only want the second of these results to obtain.
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Happily, the new measure E gets these cases exactly right. In the case
from figure 6, we intervene to give S a positive value. In doing so we
break the edge between S and G and leave S positively correlated with LC.
The net effect is that lc gets confirmed, meaning that E(lc, s) will have a
positive value, as desired. In the case from figure 1, we intervene to give
BC a positive value. But since BC has no parents, this is just the same as
conditioning on BC = bc and since BC is independent of TH, th doesn’t
get confirmed. So E(th, bc) = 0 will hold, as desired.
Another important question concerns the relationship between E and
Schupbach and Sprenger’s condition IP, which requires that the explanatory
power of c for e is not generally proportional to the prior probability of c.
It is easy to see that E will naturally satisfy IP. For, E(e, c) measures the
extent to which intervening to make c occur is statistically relevant to e’s
occurence, and this is obviously not proportional to the prior probability of
c. Indeed, the opposite will often be the case. If c has an extremely high
prior probability, then intervening to make c occur generally won’t have
much of an effect on the probability of e. So, ceteris paribus, highly likely
causes have low explanatory power for their effects. This suggests that our
approach to explanatory power may naturally capture our preference for
‘abnormal causes’ (see e.g. Halpern and Hitchcock (2014)).2930
29One prominent issue in the causal explanation literature concerns the phenomenon of causal
overdetermination. To illustrate, suppose that there are two extremely accurate marksmen M1
and M2, and a potential gunshot victim who might die, D. Further, suppose that whether
M1 shoots is independent of whether M2 shoots, but if either of them shoot, D is extremely
likely. Now, suppose that we want to explain D by M1 shooting. If we happen to know nothing
about whether or not M2 shot, then our account gives the intuitively correct verdict that this
is a very good explanation, since M1’s shooting renders D much less surprising. However, if
we also happen to know that M2 shot, then M1 shooting would be a very poor explanation
since intervening to make M1 shoot would not make D significantly less surprising (because D
is already near-guaranteed by M2’s shooting). Thus, our approach to causal explanatory power
appears to give intuitive results for cases of causal overdetermination. This is a topic we will
explore in more detail in future work.
30At this juncture, it is also worth mentioning that, despite some surface similarity, our account
of causal explanatory power is very different from the accounts proposed by Halpern (2016). The
essential difference is that according to any of the notions of explanatory power suggested by
Halpern, the extent to which c explains e does not track the extent to which c renders e less
surprising. Our focus on surprise reduction is what allows our approach to favour abnormal
causes without any additional apparatus.
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5.4.1 An Objection
Finally, consider the following example. Ettie’s Dad went to see the local
football team play in a crucial end of season match. Unfortunately, Ettie
was busy on the day of the game, so she couldn’t go with him. On her way
home, she read a newspaper headline saying that the local team had lost.
When she got home, she asked him ‘Dad, why did we lose?’, to which her
witty father replied ‘because we were losing by fifty points when the fourth
quarter started’. Understandably, Ettie still wanted to better understand
why her team lost, so she asked her Dad why they were down by so much
entering the fourth quarter. He replied that their best player was injured in
the opening minutes of the game, and, finally, Ettie’s curiosity ran out.
This may look like a problem for our account in a couple ways. First,
it may seem that when Ettie’s Dad answered her initial question, a better
answer would have been that the best player got injured, even though E will
assign his actual answer a much higher degree of explanatory power (since a
massive fourth quarter deficit renders the loss more certain than does a first
quarter injury). Second, as the story is told, Ettie asks her second question
in order to better understand why her favorite team lost, but according to
E, the player’s injury does not qualify as explanatory of the loss (since her
background knowledge of the fourth quarter deficit would seem to screen off
the injury from the loss).
Regarding the first problem, there are a couple of things to say. Firstly,
this problem is not unique to our approach. Schupbach and Sprenger’s mea-
sure ε will be equally susceptible to such examples, since trailing by fifty
points in the fourth quarter is more highly correlated with losing than is an
early injury to one’s best player, and ε tracks statistical relevance. Indeed,
any approach that tracks the reduction of surprise will treat this case in this
way. Secondly, and more importantly, there may be more than one sense
in which one explanation can be more successful than another. On the one
hand, being down by fifty points entering the fourth very strongly causally
explains the loss (in much the same way that the penultimate domino’s
falling strongly explains the last domino’s fall) by almost entirely eliminat-
ing any surprise. On the other hand, the injury may be a deeper explanation
(perhaps because it explains more facts about the causal system). We be-
lieve that explanatory depth is worthy of philosophical investigation, but the
measure E should be taken as a measure of explanatory power, not explana-
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tory depth.31 Moreover, relative to the empty set of background knowledge,
our account does capture the sense in which the injury explains more, since
the injury is explanatorily relevant to two variables in the system, while
fourth quarter deficit is explanatorily relevant to only one.
Regarding the second problem, when we think carefully about this case,
upon hearing her Dad’s initial answer, Ettie acquires a new fact that she
wants explained–namely, the massive fourth quarter deficit. Upon doing so,
it seems that Ettie’s explanatory target shifts, and that the player’s injury
is (relative to her background knowledge) a strong explanation of the new
explanatory target. Our account gets this exactly right.
6 Conclusion
In summary, we have presented a novel method for determining the extent to
which an event c causally explains another event e. Unlike others before us,
our approach successfully captures the effect that background knowledge has
on judgements of explanatory power. Moreover, our account can distinguish
between genuine and illegitimate causal explanations without recourse to
any external theory of explanation.
In future work, we hope to explore
i How and whether these resources can be used to understand and refine
the notion of ‘explanatory depth’.
ii The bearing of this approach upon questions surrounding our prefer-
ence for abnormal causes.
iii How and whether our account can be extended to deal with‘multi-
level’ explanations in which synchronic dependence relations such as
supervenience play a role.
iv The possibility of empirically testing our account of causal explana-
tory power as predictive of the way people actually make explanatory
judgements.
31See Hitchcock and Woodward (2003) for a good discussion of explanatory depth.
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